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[erim. No. 6243. In Bank. Oct. 1, 1958J

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ROBE:W,t.)J9SHANN,
Appellant.
[1] Witnesse&-PrivilegedOommQi.J:&tioDS-PubUc Officers.-De-

fendant was entitled to disclosure of the identity of the informer where an alleged sale of he.!1!in.}y d~fendant was made
to an inform~r, eviden~(Lth.a".Lc!.!!fend.!mt received two telephone
calls from the informer and made a sale to the informer did
not establish that he knew the informer's identity, and that
very evidence was in iss~ view of defendant's denial that
he received such calls or that he made such sale j in the absence
of a finding that defendant knew·tne" informer it could not
be assumed that he did.
[2] Id.-Privileged Oomm11DicatioDS-PubUc Officera.-The common-law privilege of nondisclosure of an informer's identity
is based on publi~y, its ~se being the furtherance
and protection of the.lt!!blic interest in effective ~~w enforce._." ment mil in assuring e informer of Borne protection against
reprisals j disclosure of" th!! jnformer's identity ord'mirily "CRatroys his usefulness in obtaining information thereafter.
[Sa, Sb] Id.~Privileged OommunicationS-PubUc Officers.-Under
Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 6, encompassing the privilege
of nondisclosure of informers, _~~~st is whether the pu~~
interest would suffer by the disclosure.
[4] Id.-Privileged Oomm11DicatioDS-PubUc Officera.-It is for
the court to determine whether the public interest will suffer
by disclosure of an informer.
[1] Privilege of communication made to public officera, notes, 9
A.L.B. 1099; 59 A.L.B. 1555. See also Oal.J'ur., Witnesses, § 31 j
Am.J'ur., Witnesses, §§ 535,536.
14cX. Dig. Reference: [1-12] Witnesses, 160.
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[6] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-Public Oflicers.-At common
law the privilege.of nondiselo!lllreo1:an informer_c~~~ot
be invoked if the identity of the informer was known to those
who had eause to resent the communieation.
[6] Id.-Privileged Communication&-Public Oflicers.-A defendant who knows the identity of an informer is not ordinarily
prejudiced by refusal to disclose that identity.
[7] Id.-Privileged Communications-Public Oflicers.-There is no
privilege of nondisclosure of an informer if disclosure is relevant and helpful to the defense of the aeeused or essential
to a fair determination of a cause.
[8] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-Public Oflicers.-Disclosure
of an informer is not limited to the Jwormer who participates
in the crime alleged; the information elicited from an informer may be relevant and helpful to the defense of the
aecused or essential to a fair determination of a cause though
the informer was uot a participant, a1l where the testimony of
an eyewitness-nonparticipant informer would vindieate the
innocence of the aceused or lessen the risk of false testimony.
[9] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-Public Oflicers.-Identity of
an informer is ordinarily not neeessary to defendant's ease,
and the privilege against nondisclo),pre prQperlY II,plllies. [10] Id.-Privileged Communications-Public Oflicers.-When it
appears from the evidenee that an informer is a material witness on the issue of guilt, his identity is relevant and may be
helpful to defendant; nondiselosure woul.d. Ael>!ive him of a
fair trial.
[11] Id.-Privileged Communications-Public Oflicers.-When it
appears from the evidence that an informer is a J:.Daterial witness on the issue of guilt and the accused seeks djsclosure
on cross-examination, the People must either disclose his
identity or ineur a dismissal. (Disapp~o.Yl!t.E implications to
the eontrary inPeopZe v. Cox, 156 Cal.App.2d 472, 477 [319
P.2d 681); People v. Gonzales, 136 Cal.App.2d 437, 440-441
[288 P.2d 588).)
.
[12] Id.-Privileged Communications-Publie Oflicers.-Where, in
a proseeution for u~Is..wfULpossession of heroin, an infQwer's
telephone eall to defendant was persuasiye evidenee on possession as indieating that defendant was en route to make a
sale of heroin when he was arrested and therefore knowingly
had possession at the time, andwhere ..the People, instead of
relying solely on the testimony of the officers as to defendant's
possession of heroin and as to his admissions without reference to the telephone eall, made the informer a witness by in;
troducing evidence of his telephone call and by playing a
reeording of the telephone eonversation before the jury, the--'
informer, as the originator of the teleph~~e eall, was a ma-
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terial witness on the iuue of po88ession, and defendant,
denied receiving the call, had DO fair opportunity tolnl~
stantiate his denial and impeach the testimony of the omcers
without disclosure of the informer's identity, and refuaal to
disclose his identity was prejudicial error.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of A1ameda County. Marvin Sherwin, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for illegal sale and possession of heroin. Judgment of conviction reversed.
.
Vaughns, Dixon & White and Clinton W. White for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Victor Griffith, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction on two counts of violation of section 11500 of the
Health and Safety Code. Count one charged a sale of heroin
on November 26, 1956. Count two charged possession of
heroin on November 27, 1956.
The prosecution's evidence showed that on November 26,
1956, Police Officers McBee, Hilliard, Leen, and Goodrum
met a con1idential informer in Oakland. Officers McBee and
Hilliard searched the informer and found no narcotics on ,;
him. The informer, accompanied by the four officers, then J
went to the Oakland Police Department where he made an ..
appointment by telephone for the purchase of narcotics from ,
defendant. Officer McBee dialed the number listed for the
residence of defendant, and a recording was made of the eonversation. Officers McBee, Hilliard, and Goodrum were present during the telephone conversation and laterlisteued to the
recording. The recording was played before the jury, and
the officers identified the voice talking to the informer as defendant's.
The officers gave the informer a $20 bill, a $10 bm and a
$5.00 bill, each dusted with fluorescent powder. 'l'bey took
him to the vicinity of Market and Grand Streets where he
entered an automobile driven by defendant. 0fIieer McBee
followed the automobile until he lost sight of it. Ten or
fifteen minutes later the informer entered Officer McBee's
automobile at 21st and Market Streets and gave OfIieer McBee
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a small bindle containing a white powder later identified as
heroin. Otftct'r Goodrum saw the informer enter the automobile identified as defendant's and followed it until the
informer got out and entered Officer McBee's automobile.
On November 27,1956, the informer again made a telephone
call to defendant, which was also recorded (and later played
to the jury), and arranged to purchase heroin from him at
a bar. Officer McBee and the informer then went to the
vicinity of the bar. Later Officer Hilliard joined them, and
after listening to the recorded conversa.tion he obtained a warrant to search defendant's premises.
On November 27th Officers Goodrum, Reppas,and W oishnis
kept defendant's residence under surveillance. Officer Hilliard instructed them to follow defendant when he left his
residence and arrest him at the first opportunity. Thereafter defendant left his residence in an automobile. Be
stopped at the intersection of Adeline and Market Streets
f~r. '-_ traffic signal, and the officers drove their automobile in
front of his and told him that he was under arrest. They told
him to back his car into a gas station and to get out and
place his hands on top of the car. As he got out of the car,
Officer Woishnis observed a "silvery flutter" and said: "He
dropped it." Officer Goodrum saw something shiny "hit off
of his [defendant's] shoe and land on the ground .••• "
Officer Reppas picked up four tinfoil packages and asked
defendant: "What about these'" Defendant said he didn't
know anything about them. A smaller package wrapped in
cellophane was found in defendant's pocket. All five packages
eontained heroin. The officers, together with Officers Billiard
and McBee,then went to defendant's residence and searched
it. They found $1,058, including a $20 bill, a $10 bill and a
$5.00 bill on which an ultraviolet light disclosed a large
amount of fluorescent powder. The prosecution's evidence
also showed that defendant made certain admissions after his
arrest.
Defendant testified that he was not a party to the alleged
telephone conversations, denied the alleged meeting with the
informer, and denied that he had possession of narcotics on
November 27th.
During the cross-examination of Officers McBee and Billiard before the jury and of Officer Hilliard on the hearing on
probable cause in the absence of the jury, the trial court sustained on the ground of privilege (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881,
subd. 5) the prosecution's objection to questions by the de-
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fense seeking to obtain the name of the informer. Defendani~
contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in
iuataining thooc objections.Count One: The Sale of Heroin on November 26, 1956
[1] Since the alleged sale by the defendant was to the
informer, defendant was clearly entitled to disclosure of his
identity. (Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 58 [77
S.Ot. 623, 1 L.Ed. 639] ; People v. Alvarez, 154 Cal.App.2d
694, 696 [316 P.2d 1006] ; People v. Cas tiel, 153 Cal.App.2d
653, 656-659 [315 P.2d 79]; People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal.
App.2d 435, 451 [308 P.2d 821].) The People contend, however, that defendant was not prejudiced invoking the evidence
that defendant received two telephone calls from the informer
and that he made a sale to the informer to establish that the
defendant knew the informer's identity. That very evidence
was in issue, however, for defendant denied that he received
such calls or that he made such a sale. There was no finding
that the defendant knew the informer and it cannot be
assumed that he did. Such an assumption would in effect
assume his guilt. (See R01'iaro v. United States, supra, 353
U.S. at 60.)
Count Two: The Possession of Heroin on November 27, 1956
The People seek to uphold the conviction on count two on
the grounds that the informer's identity has no bearing on
that charge and that in any event there is a privilege of
nondisclosure of informers.
[2] The common-law privilege of nondisclosure is based
on public policy. "The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law
enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of
crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their
anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation."
(Rotliaro v. United States, IUpra, 353 U.S. at 59.) The informer is thus assured of some protection against reprisals.
The use of informers is particularly effective in the enforcementof sumptuary laws such as those directed against gambling, prostitution, or the sale and use of liquor and narcotics.
Disclosure of the informer's identity ordinarily destroys his
usefulness in obtaining information thereafter. (See Don-Defendant does not contend that the reeorded telephone conversations
were an unlawul interception and therefore inadmissible. (See People
v. MaloHe, (6 CaUld 59, 6{ [292 P.2d 517].)
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nelly, .Tudicial Control of Informanis, Spies, Siool Pigeon"
and Agent Provocateurs, 60 Yale L. J. 1091, 1093; 1 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 405, 512.)
[Sa] Section 18tH, subdivision 5 of the Code of Civil
Procedure encompasses the privilege of nondisclosure of informers: "A public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the public
interest would suffer. by the disclosure." There is a divergence
of opinion as to whether the common-law privilege covers
only the identity of the informer or also includes the contents
of the communication. (See McCormick, Evidence (1954],
pp. 309-311; Donnelly, IUpra, 60 Yale L. J. at 1094-1095;
98 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 719, 730.) Since the reasons for the
privilege relate primarily to the identity of the informer,
some authorities take the position that the privilege does not
extend to the communications unless the contents would disclose or tend to disclose the identity of the informer. (See
Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.l, vol. 8, p. 755; McCormick,
supra, p. 310.) Under section 1881, subdivision 5 it extends
to the communications "when the public interest would
suffer by the disclosure."
[4] It is for the court to determine whether the public
interest will suffer by disclosure. (See Dwelly v. McReynolds, 6 Cal.2d 128, 131 [56 P.2d 1232] ; Wigmore, IUpra, vol.
8 at 798-801; 22 Cal. L. Rev. 667,676.) [6] At common law
the privilege could not be invoked if the identity of the
informer was known to those who had cause to resent the
communication. (See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53,
60 [77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639].) [3b] Under section 1881,
subdivision 5 the test is whether the public interest would
suffer by the disclosure. Conceivably, even when the informer
may be known to persons who have cause to resent the
communication, disclosure in open court might still be against
the public interest. [6] A--defendant who knows the identity of the informer, however, will ordinarily not be prejudiced by a refusal to disclose that identity.
[7] There is general agreement that there is no privilege
of nondisclosure if disclosure "is relevant and helpful to the
defense of the accused or essential to a fair determination of
R cause ... "
(Roviaro v. United States, supra, 353 U.S. at
60-61; see People v. Castiel, supra, 153 Cal.App.2d at 659;
People v. Lawrence, supra, 149 CalApp.2d at 451; Portornene
v. U'liited States, 221 F.2d 582, 583-584; U'liited States v.
CO'lforti, 200 F.2d 365, 367; Sorrenti'110 v. United States, 163
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F.2d 627, 628-629; Unitea States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d .
650, 651-652; Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390, 392;
Marks v. R('.'II/1,Il, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 404, 498; Centoamore v..
State, 105 Neb. 452 [181 N.W. 182, 183] ; McCormick, supra, \
p. 310; Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence [1954], p. 119; I
Wharton, Criminal Evidence [12th ed.], vol. 3, pp. 136-137;
Wigmore, supra, vol. 8, p. 756; Underhill, Criminal Evidence,
vol. 2, pp. 820-821; 22 Cal. L. Rev. 667, 670; 98 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 719, 730-731; 1945 Wis. L. Rev. 239, 244-245; Uniform Rules of Evidence, rule 36.)
[8] Disclosure is not limited to the informer who participates in the crime alleged. The information elicited from an
informer may be "relevant and helpful to the defense of the
accused or essential to a fair determination of a cause" even
though the informer was not a participant. For example,
the testimony of an eyewitness-nonparticipant informer that
would vindicate the innocence of the accused or lessen the risk
of false testimony would obviously be relevant and helpful to
the defense of the accused and essential to a fair determination
of the cause.
Disclosure is frequently a problem in such cases as the
present one involving violations of the narcotics laws, when
the so-called informer is also a material witness on the issue
of guilt. A mere informer has a limited role. "When such
a person is truly an informant he simply points the finger of
suspicion toward a person who has violated the law. He puts
the wheels in motion which cause the defendant to be suspected and perhaps arrested, but he plays no part in the
criminal act with which the defendant is later charged."
(People v. Lawrence, 8'Upra, 149 Cal.App.2d at 450.) [9] His
identity is ordinarily not necessary to the defendant's case,
and the privilege against disclosure properly applies.
[10] When it appears from the evidence, however, that
the informer is also a material witness on the issue of guilt,
his identity is relevant and may be helpful to the defendant.
Nondisclosure would deprive him of a fair trial. [11] Thus,
when it appears from the evidence that the informer is a
material witness on the issue of guilt and the accused seeks
disclosure on cross-examination, the People must either disclose his identity or incur a dismissal. (See Rovwro v. United
States, supra, 353 U.S. at 61.) Any implications to the contrary in PeopZe v. Cox, 156 Cal.App.2d 472, 477 [319 P.2d
681], and People v. Gonzales, 136 Cal.App.2d 487, 440-441
[288 P.2d 588], are disapproved.
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Jencks v. United Statu, 853 U.S. 657, 671-672 177 S.Ct.
1007,1 L.Ed.2d 1103], involved a comparable situation wherein the defendant sought the production of F.B.I. reports made
by the two principal witnesses against him on a charge that
he falsely swore in an a1Bdavit that he was not a member of
the communist party. The court stated: "It is unquestionably true that the protection of vital national interests may
militate against public disclosure of documents in the Government's possession.... The Attorney General has adopted
regulations ••• declaring all Justice Department records confidential and that no disclosure, including disclosure in response to a subpoena, may be made without his permission.
"But this Court has noticed in United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1 [73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727, 82 A.L.R.2d 382],
the holdings of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
that, in criminal causes '. • • the Government can invoke its
evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free. The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since
the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the
duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow
it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental
privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be
material to his defense.... ' 345 U.S., at 12."
[12] Likewise, if the informer in the present case was a
material witness as to the possession charged in count two,
the refusal to disclose his identity was prejudicial error as
to that count.
Defendant denied that he had heroin in his possession and
denied that he received the alleged telephone call. Officer
McBee and Oflicer Hilliard testified to the telephone call, and
a recording thereof cut by Officer Hilliard was played before
the jury. The informer's telephone call was persuasive evidence on possession, for it indicated that defendant was en
route to make a sale of heroin when he was arrested and
therefore knowingly had· possession at that time. As the
originator of the telephone call the informer was a material
witness on the issue of possession. The prosecution made him
such a witness by introducing evidence of his telephone call
to make a purchase of heroin and by playing a recording of
the telephone conversation before the jury.
The prosecution could have relied solely on the testimony
of the omcers as to defendant's possession of heroin and as
to his admissions without reference to the telephone call.
Thev p.\ose instead also to introduce evidence of the telephone
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. call, which substantiated the testimony of Officers Goodrum .
and Reppas and discredited defendant's. Defendant denied
receiving the call. He had no fair opportunity to substantiate
I1Is denial and impeach the testimony of the officers without ,
disclosure of the informer's identity. Had there been dis- I
closure, the informer might have testified that no suCh telephone Call was made, that it was not defendant who received
the call, that someone else was called, or that there was an
entrapment.
The cross-examination of Officers McBee and Hilliard as to
the telephone call and the identity of its originator dealt
with an alleged telephone call to the defendant setting up a
sale and the identity of the person making that call. It did
not deal with communications made to them "in confidence"
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. (5» or with the identity of
a person making communications "in confidence."
There are strong parallels between the instant case and
BOtIiaro v. United States, aupra. 353 U.S. at 58-59, wherein
defendant was charged with a sale of heroin (connt one) and
with "illegal transportation of narcotics" (count two). A
conviction under count two was proper "when the Government has proved that the accused possessed narcotics, unless
the accused explains or justifies such possession." (353 U.S.
at 63.) The Government sought to uphold the conviction on
count two on the ground that the identity of the informer
(John Doe) had no bearing on that charge and was therefore
privileged. The Government had introduced evidence that
John Doe had a conversation in his car with defendant as he
drove him to a place where defendant got out of the car,
walked to a nearby tree, picked up a small package, returned
and deposited the package in Doe's car and left in another
car. An officer secreted in the trunk of Doe's car testified
to the conversation between Doe and the defendant, and both
he and another officer testified that they saw the defendant
pick up the small package and return to Doe's car. The
package contained an opium derivative. The court held that
under the circumstances, "John Doe's possible testimony was
highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense.•..
The informer was the only witness [other than the accused]
in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses." (353 U.S. at 63-64.)
Although the informer in the present case was not an eyewitness to the crime, as John Doe was in the Roviaro case,
the prosecution's own election to introduce evidence of the
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telephone conversation made it imperative that it disclose the
identity of thf' infoTTnm', for he alone could amplify or contradict the testimony of the officers. As in the Roviaro ease
nondisclosure was prejudicial error.
The judgment is reversed as to both counts.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

)

SPENCE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
reversal as to count one but dissent from the reversal as to
count two. In my opinion, the case of R01Jiaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53 [77 8.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639], is not
authority for the majority's reversal as to both counts, but
on the contrary, clearly indicates that the judgment of conviction on the second count should be affirmed.
In the Roviaro case, the two charges were (1) sale of
narcotics and (2) illegal transportation of narcotics. Both
charges arose out of a single transaction occurring on August
12, 1954. The Government did not "defend the nondisclosure of Doe's identity with respect to Count 1, which
charged a sale of heroin to John Doe," but it sought "to sustain the judgment on the basis of the conviction on Count
2, charging illegal transportation of narcotics." (Pp. 58-59.)
The court there held that, under the circumstances, it was
reversible error as to both counts for the trial court to deny
disclosure of the identity of the informer.
In so holding with respect to the second count, the court,
after stating that "no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is
justifiable" (p. 62), was careful to point out that the second
count there did not "charge mere possession" (p. 63); that
the informer had "been present with the accused at the occurrence of the alleged crime" of illegal transportation (p. 55) ;
and that "the Government's informer was the sole participant,
other than the accused, in the transaction charged" (p. 64).
In the present case, count two did charge "mere possession" ;
the informer was not" present with the accused at the occurrence of the alleged crime" charged in count two; and the
informer was not a participant in the offense of "mere possession" on November 27, 1956, as distinguished from the
prior offense of sale on November 26, 1956.
If, as declared in the Roviaro case, the problem is one of
"balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense" ;
and if the question of error in refusing disclosure depends
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"on the particular circumstances of each case" (p. 62), I am
of the view that the balance here is clearly in favor of the
public interest. The compelling reasons for preventing disclosure of the identity of informers, except where the interests of justice demand it, are forcefully stated in the dissent
of Mr. Justice Clark in the Roviaro case. Here, however, we
have only to follow the implications of the majority opinion
in that case in order to sustain the judgment of conviction as
to count two.
I would therefore reverse as to count one but affirm as to
count two.
Shenk, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in
the reversal of the judgment as to count one, but dissent from
the reversal of the judgment as to count two.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied October
28,1958. Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

